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I. INTRODUCTION
When the Indian Reorganization Act1 (“IRA”) was passed in 1934, it offi-
cially defined an “Indian” as a member of a recognized tribe “now under fed-
eral jurisdiction.”2  For nearly three-quarters of a century, this definition of an
Indian and an Indian tribe — hallmarked by the four-word phrase “now under
federal jurisdiction” —  guided federal policy and agency action on a host of
matters, including management of federal lands, land-into-trust acquisitions
made on behalf of tribes, and — after 1988 — application of the Indian Gam-
ing Regulatory Act (“IGRA”).3
In February 2009, however, the United States Supreme Court upended
seventy-five years of administrative interpretation.  The Court held that “now
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1 25 U.S.C. §§ 461-479 (2010).  The IRA is also known as the Wheeler-Howard Act,
48 Stat. 984, (codified at 25 U.S.C. §§ 461-479).  Much of the initiative for Congress’ enact-
ment of the IRA came from John Collier, Sr., who served as Commissioner of the Bureau of
Indian Affairs between 1933 and 1945. See John Collier (reformer), http://en.wikipedia.org/
wiki/John_Collier_(reformer) (last visited Apr. 14, 2010).
2 25 U.S.C. § 479 (2010).  The IRA defines the term “Indian” as including “all persons of
Indian descent who are members of any recognized Indian tribe now under federal jurisdic-
tion, and all persons who are descendants of such members who were, on June 1, 1934,
residing within the present boundaries of any Indian reservation, and shall further include all
other persons of one-half or more Indian blood.” Id.  (emphasis added).
3 See Supreme Court Decision, Carcieri v. Salazar, Ramifications to Indian Tribes:  Over-
sight Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Natural Resources, 111th Cong. 12 (2009) [hereinaf-
ter Ramifications Hearing] (statement of Michael J. Anderson, Partner, AndersonTuell,
LLP).
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under federal jurisdiction” in Section 479 of the IRA “unambiguously refers”
only to those tribes that were under federal jurisdiction in 1934 when the IRA
was enacted.4  In doing so, the Court seemingly stripped the Department of the
Interior of any ability to acquire or expand new reservation lands for certain
Indian tribes.  While the Secretary of the Interior remains authorized to take
land into trust for Indian tribes, the temporal limitation imposed by the Carcieri
v. Salazar holding now governs that authority, precluding the Secretary from
taking land into trust for tribes that were not federally recognized in 1934.5
The High Court’s holding caused a shockwave to ripple throughout Indian
Country.  Tribes, legislators, agency officials, practitioners of Indian and gam-
ing law, and legal scholars speculated as to the potential ramifications of
Carcieri for tribes whose land-into-trust applications were pending before the
Department of the Interior.  While some championed the Court’s holding, many
observers believed it called for remedial measures designed to restore the pre-
Carcieri status quo with respect to the land-into-trust process.  The most prom-
inent of these proposed measures, or “Carcieri Fixes,” are the primary focus of
this article.
II. PRE-CARCIERI:  “NOW” MEANS “CURRENTLY”
A. A Brief History of Time:  Federal Policy On Indian Lands
1. Early Federal Policy:  “Indian Removal” and Assimilation
Prior to 1934, federal policy on Indian affairs was directed at removing
Indians from their ancestral lands and assimilating them into the cultural main-
stream of the United States and its European immigrants.6  In the years directly
after the United States gained independence from Britain, the federal govern-
ment positioned itself, at least officially, in a protective, even paternalistic,
position vis-a`-vis Indian tribes.7  In 1790, the “Nonintercourse Act” authorized
Congress to protect tribes’ rights to control their ancestral lands by regulating
all land sales or transfers involving Indians or Indian tribes.8  But the nine-
teenth-century policy of Indian removal, inaugurated by President Andrew
Jackson’s signing of the Indian Removal Act9 into law, signaled the federal
government’s unwillingness to adhere to earlier “promises to protect the Indi-
ans’ land and sovereignty” and “solemnly” guarantee those tribes’ rights to any
4 Carcieri v. Salazar, 129 S.Ct. 1058, 1068 (2009).
5 Id. at 1061.
6 See Ramifications Hearing, supra note 3, at 5 (statement of Colette Routel, Visiting Assis-
tant Professor, University of Michigan Law School).
7 See City of Sherrill v. Oneida Indian Nation, 544 U.S. 197, 204 (2005) (“The Federal
Government initially pursued a policy protective of . . . Indians, undertaking to secure the
Tribes’ rights to reserved lands.”).
8 Indian Nonintercourse Act, ch. 23, 1 Stat. 137 (1790) (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C.
§ 117 (2000)).
9 Indian Removal Act of 1830, ch. 148, 4 Stat. 411.
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Indian lands not previously ceded.10  Instead, Congress now authorized remov-
ing entire tribes from their homelands by force or show of force.11
Federal policy and popular belief held that removal of a tribe’s land base
— whether by forcible relocation of an entire tribe or by steady reduction of
tribal land holdings as a result of allotting reservation land to individual Indians
— would achieve the goal of assimilation “within a generation or two.”12  In
the federal government’s quest to fulfill its “Manifest Destiny,”13 numerous
tribes were stripped of their vast ancestral lands, as well as any real property
holdings, by means of treaties, statutes, and allotment policies.  Groups of tribe
members of the now landless tribes were relocated to “reservations” hundreds
of miles distant from their ancestral territories.  Many tribe members did not
survive the relocation process.  Others failed to thrive in their strange, new
environments.14
Implementation of the federal policy deliberately destroyed many social
institutions of the affected tribes.15  Important tribal traditions, culture, and oral
history were often lost in the void remaining after tribe members were exiled
from their historic homelands.16  The ranks of various tribes were decimated, as
10 Choctaw Nation v. Oklahoma, 397 U.S. 620, 623, 625 (1970) (quoting Treaty of Holston,
U.S. - Cherokee Nation, July 2, 1791, 7 Stat. 39, 40; see also Indian Intercourse Act of 1802,
2 Stat. 139).  So great was the national drive for westward expansion that Congress was
“unable or unwilling to prevent the States and their citizens from violating Indian rights.”
Choctaw, 397 U.S. at 625.
11 See Choctaw, 397 U.S. at 625.
12 South Dakota v. Yankton Sioux Tribe, 522 U.S. 329, 335 (1998) (citing Readjustment of
Indian Affairs – History of the Allotment Policy:  Hearing on H.R. 7902 Before the H.
Comm. on Indian Affairs, 73d Cong., 428 (1934) (statement of D. S. Otis)).
13 John L. O’Sullivan, a Jacksonian-era writer and founding editor of The United States
Magazine and Democratic Review, coined the term “Manifest Destiny” in 1845.  In an essay
entitled Annexation, O’Sullivan urged the federal government to annex Texas, asserting that
the “manifest destiny” of the United States was “to overspread the continent allotted by
Providence for the free development of our yearly multiplying millions.”  John L.
O’Sullivan, Annexation, U.S. MAG. & DEMOCRATIC REV. 5 (Jul./Aug. 1845).  O’Sullivan
later elaborated, in the December 27, 1845 edition of the New York Morning News:  “And
that claim is by the right of our manifest destiny to overspread and to possess the whole of
the continent which Providence has given us for the development of the great experiment of
liberty and federated self-government entrusted to us.”  John O’Sullivan, Editorial, The True
Title, N.Y. MORNING NEWS, Dec. 27, 1845.
For more on the notion of Manifest Destiny, which pervaded American national and
foreign policy well into the twentieth century, see Robert W. Johannsen, The Meaning of
Manifest Destiny, in MANIFEST DESTINY AND EMPIRE: AMERICAN ANTEBELLUM EXPANSION-
ISM 7 (Sam W. Hayes & Christopher Morris, eds., 1997).
14 See generally COHEN’S HANDBOOK ON FEDERAL INDIAN LAW § 1.04 (2009).
15 See Duro v. Reina 495 U.S. 676, 691 (1990), superceded by statute, 25 U.S.C. §1301
(noting that the decades prior to the Indian Reorganization Act’s passage in 1934 were
marked by federal “policy favoring elimination of tribal institutions, sale of tribal lands, and
assimilation of Indians as individuals into the dominant culture”). See also California v.
Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202, 208 (1987) (noting the symbiotic relation-
ship of tribal land holdings to sovereignty and viability of tribal institutions and recognizing
that “a grant to States of general civil regulatory power over Indian reservations would result
in the destruction of tribal institutions and values”).
16 Captain Richard Henry Pratt, a leading nineteenth-century proponent of assimilation-
through-education and the founder of the Indian boarding school movement, touted the prin-
ciple of “kill the Indian and save the man,” denoting his utter contempt for native traditions,
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tribe members were exposed to hostile environmental conditions, poverty, hun-
ger, contagious disease, and harsh treatment at the hands of the federal military
or local residents of the so-called Indian territories.17  Entire tribes were wiped
out completely.  Tribes previously recognized by the federal government as
capable of sustaining a “government-to-government” relationship with the
United States were not immune.  Nor were “treaty tribes” — those who, like
the Cherokee, were parties to federal treaties affirming their land holdings and
intact status — spared the devastating consequences of the nineteenth- and
early twentieth-century policy of removal and assimilation.18
2. Policy Reform and the IRA
Fortunately, in 1934, federal policy with regard to tribes and Indian affairs
was turned on its head.  The “cornerstone of the Indian New Deal,”19 the Indian
Reorganization Act of April 22, 1934, secured certain rights to Indians and
restored to tribes their ability to be self-governing and manage their own
assets.20  Most tribal assets at that time were in the form of lands held in trust
by the federal government for the benefit of a particular tribe and its members.
With the IRA, Congress clearly articulated a policy of “‘rehabilitat[ing] the
Indian’s economic life and . . . giv[ing] him a chance to develop the initiative
destroyed by a century of oppression and paternalism.’”21  As a result of the
IRA and related judicial and legislative initiatives, over two million acres of
land were restored to tribal management during the two decades that followed
the Act’s passage.22
Now, instead of promoting assimilation of individual tribe members and
destruction of any vestige of a tribe’s social infrastructure, federal policy
shifted to encouraging tribes to exist as separate “domestic sovereign”23 entities
beliefs, and practices and his conviction that, by removing Indian children from their tribal
environments and steeping them in the ways of the white man, they could be “civilized” and
become like other citizens. See CAROLYN J. MARR, ASSIMILATION THROUGH EDUCATION:
INDIAN BOARDING SCHOOLS IN THE PACIFIC NORTHWEST (2000), available at http://con-
tent.lib.washington.edu/aipnm/marr.html#movement.
17 The Oklahoma Historical Society notes that one in four Cherokees died when the federal
government forcibly detained thousands in “disease-ridden” concentration camps before
driving them further west, away from their ancestral lands.  Oklahoma Historical Society,
Encyclopedia of Oklahoma History & Culture, Indian Removal, http://digital.library.okstate.
edu/encyclopedia/entries/I/IN015.html (last visited Apr. 14, 2010).  Other tribes, including
the Choctaw, the Chickasaw, the Creek, and the Seminole, suffered similarly. Id. See gen-
erally GRANT FOREMAN, INDIAN REMOVAL: THE EMIGRATION OF THE FIVE CIVILIZED TRIBES
OF INDIANS (3d 1972).
18 Rachel San Kronowitz et al., Comment, Toward Consent and Cooperation:  Reconsider-
ing the Political Status of Indian Nations, 22 HARV. C.R.- C.L. L. REV. 507, 530 (1987)
(noting that the General Allotment Act intentionally overrode treaties with Indian tribes).
19 Carcieri v. Salazar, 129 S. Ct. 1058, 1073 n.4 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
20 25 U.S.C. §§ 461-479 (2010).
21 Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 U. S. 145, 152 (1973) (quoting H.R. REP. NO.
1804, at 6 (1934)) (cited in Carcieri, 129 S. Ct. at 1073 n.4 (Stevens, J., dissenting)).
22 Indian Reorganization Act, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Indian_Reorganization_Act (last
visited Apr. 14, 2010).
23 See American Vantage Cos., Inc. v. Table Mountain Rancheria, 292 F.3d 1091, 1096 (9th
Cir. 2002) (describing Indian tribes as “domestic dependent nations” and holding that they
are not citizens of a state for the purposes of diversity jurisdiction).
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within the federal system.24  Tribes were encouraged to govern and provide for
the economic wellbeing of their members.  As a key feature of this new federal
policy approach, the government would provide the remaining Indian tribes
with lands on which their members could reside, and over which the tribal
government could exercise its newly recognized sovereignty.25  This would
enable tribes to re-establish social institutions, promote internal cohesiveness,
rebuild tribal infrastructure, and pursue economic development.  To accomplish
these purposes, the IRA authorized the Secretary of the Interior to acquire and
take into trust vast parcels of land to provide reservations for landless Indian
tribes.26
Since the IRA was enacted, the Department of the Interior (“the Depart-
ment”) has struggled to determine which tribes the Act covers.27  In 1977, the
Department discovered that the United States had overlooked dozens of legiti-
mate tribes, failing — on account of inadvertence or mistake — to accord them
federal recognition on a government-to-government basis.  To address this situ-
ation and avoid its recurrence, the Department crafted a formal administrative
process for recognizing tribes in 1978.  This detailed process, codified at 25
C.F.R. pt. 83 (“Part 83”), does not “grant” sovereign status nor create a new
tribe made up of Indian descendants.28  Instead, the Part 83 process recognizes
tribes that already exist.29
Part 83 sets forth seven mandatory criteria by which a tribe’s inherent
sovereignty is tested.30  The Part 83 criteria focus on establishing an unbroken
24 Alex Tallchief Skibine, Redefining the Status of Indian Tribes Within “Our Federalism”:
Beyond the Dependency Paradigm, 38 CONN. L. REV. 667, 675-77 (2006) (discussing Felix
Cohen’s plenary power-sovereignty paradigm). See also COHEN’S HANDBOOK ON FEDERAL
INDIAN LAW § 1.05 (2009).
25 California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202, 208 (1987) (noting the
symbiotic relationship of tribal land holdings to sovereignty and the viability of tribal institu-
tions and values).
26 25 U.S.C. § 465 (2010).
27 See Brief of Law Professors Specializing in Federal Indian Law as Amicus Curiae Sup-
porting Respondents at 5-6, Carcieri v. Kempthorne, 552 U.S. 1229 (2008) (No. 07-526)
[hereinafter Brief of Law Professors].
28 See id.; see also 25 C.F.R. pt 83 (2010).
29 25 C.F.R. § 83.2 (2010) (“The purpose of this part is to establish a departmental proce-
dure and policy for acknowledging that certain American Indian groups exist as tribes.”).
See also Betting on Transparency:  Toward Fairness and Integrity in the Interior Depart-
ment’s Tribal Recognition Process, Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Government Reform,
108th Cong. 39 (2004) [hereinafter Transparency Hearing] (statement of Theresa Rosier,
Counselor to the Asst. Sec’y, Indian Affairs) (“When the Department acknowledges an
Indian tribe, it is acknowledging that an inherent sovereign continues to exist.  The Depart-
ment is not ‘granting’ sovereign status or powers to the group, nor creating a tribe made up
of Indian descendants.”).
30 25 C.F.R. § 83.7 (2010).  The petitioner must show:  (1) that “[t]he petitioner has been
identified as an American Indian entity on a substantially continuous basis since 1900”; (2)
that a “predominant portion of the petitioning group” currently makes up a “distinct commu-
nity” that has existed as a community since historical times; (3) that “[t]he petitioner has
maintained political influence or authority over its members as an autonomous entity from
historical times until the present”; (4) membership criteria and a currently-in-force governing
document; (5) that the group’s members are descendants of a historical Indian tribe; (6) that
most of the group’s members “are not members of any [federally-recognized] North Ameri-
can Indian tribe”; and (7) that no applicable federal legislation expressly terminates or for-
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connection between the tribe’s historic roots and the modern-day identity of the
group.  A group must show it meets each of the seven criteria in order to be
eligible for federal recognition as an Indian tribe.31
Many of the Part 83 criteria can be met in several ways.32  Nonetheless, to
tribes faced with the uphill battle of seeking federal recognition, the Part 83
criteria may appear narrow and unforgiving.33  Demonstrating a continuous
connection between historic autonomy and modern identity can pose an enor-
mous challenge for an unrecognized tribe.34  Past federal policy and practice,
intermarriage by necessity, general hostility from the dominant surrounding
culture, and other incidents and accidents of history may have obscured the
connection between the tribe’s antecedents and its modern identity as an auton-
omous sovereign entity.
In recent years, the Department has not been insensitive to these concerns.
Efforts have been made to bolster funding, increase transparency, improve the
administrative responsiveness and the user-friendliness of its systems, and com-
municate more clearly.35  As a result, since 1978 when the Part 83 regulations
were first applied, the United States has formally recognized sixteen Indian
tribes as autonomous sovereign entities.36  One such tribe, the Narragansett of
bids the federal government from having a formal government-to-government relationship
with the group or its members. Id.
31 Id.
32 Id.
33 Satisfying the Part 83 criteria requires submitting voluminous historic and anthropologi-
cal data along with the tribe’s recognition application.  The data is evaluated by the technical
staff of the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA), which includes historians, anthropologists, and
genealogists.  Staff recommendations regarding whether the data supports federal recogni-
tion are reviewed by the Department’s Office of the Solicitor and/or senior BIA officials.
The Assistant Secretary of Indian Affairs then makes a proposal regarding federal recogni-
tion.  This proposed finding is published in the Federal Register and marks the beginning of
a public comment period.  Further documents may be submitted by commentators in favor or
against recognition, and responses to comments are permitted.  The comments, along with
any additional documentation submitted, are reviewed by BIA staff, which then makes rec-
ommendations as to what the final determination should be.  This second round of recom-
mendations is subject to the same levels of review as the first round of staff
recommendations regarding the proposed finding.  Finally, the Assistant Secretary makes the
final determination, which, depending on the additional evidence received during the com-
ment period, may or may not be identical to the proposed finding. See, e.g., Recognizing a
Problem – A Hearing on Federal Tribal Recognition, Hearing Before the Subcomm. On
Energy Policy, Natural Resources and Regulatory Affairs of the H. Comm. on Governmental
Reform, 107th Cong. 24-30 (2002) (statement of Barry T. Hill, Dir., Natural Res. & Env’t,
Gen. Accounting Office) [hereinafter Hill Testimony].
34 Id. at 30 (expressing concern that a tribe’s chances of succeeding in gaining recognition
has “less to do with the attributes and qualities of a group as an independent political entity
deserving a government-to-government relationship with the United States, and more to do
with the resources that petitioners and third parties can marshal to develop successful politi-
cal and legal strategies”).
35 See, e.g., Transparency Hearing, supra note 29 (statement of Theresa Rosier) (reporting
on various efforts at improving the federal acknowledgement process between 2001 and
2004 and emphasizing the importance of enhancing the transparency, openness, and timeli-
ness of the process).
36 See Brief of Law Professors, supra note 27, at 6.  In order of their recognition, the tribes
include:  Grand Traverse Band of Ottawa & Chippewa Indians, Michigan; Jamestown
S’Klallam Tribe, Washington; Tunica-Biloxi Indian Tribe, Louisiana; Death Valley Timbi-
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present-day Rhode Island, was the unfortunate subject of a resounding blow
that the Supreme Court recently dealt to Indian self-determination.
B. The Narragansett Quest For Recognition
1. Loss and Restoration:  Tribal Status and Tribal Lands
The Narragansett Tribe has lived in present-day Rhode Island since at
least colonial settlement.37  The Tribe was among the earliest Indian tribes to
encounter European settlers and suffer the slings and arrows of colonization at
the hands of successive sovereigns.  King Phillip’s War in 1675 nearly obliter-
ated the Tribe as a distinct tribal community.38  Subsequently, in 1709, the
British Crown placed the remnants of the Tribe under the formal guardianship
of the then-Colony of Rhode Island.39
In 1880, Rhode Island, having now attained statehood, enacted a “detribal-
ization” law that abolished tribal authority, ended the State’s guardianship of
the Tribe, and attempted to sell all tribal lands.40  Wearied from nearly two
centuries of increasing pressure to surrender not only its lands but also its tribal
status and identity, the Tribe agreed to disclaim its tribal authority and sell most
of its remaining reservation lands.41  After the sale, the Tribe was left with only
two acres of land.42
Throughout the next century, the Tribe strove to regain its tribal status and
to reacquire the lands it had been pressured to give up.43  The first victory in
this process took place in 1978, when the Tribe regained some of its prior land
holdings in connection with a settlement agreement with the State of Rhode
Island.44  The agreement between the State and the Tribe was formalized in the
Rhode Island Indian Claims Settlement Act.45  The Act gave the Tribe title to
1,800 acres of land in and around Charlestown, Rhode Island.46  In exchange,
the Tribe agreed that the newly acquired lands would be subject to state law,
and that it would relinquish claims it had asserted, on the basis of aboriginal
title, to other state lands.47
Sha Shoshone Band, California; Narragansett Indian Tribe, Rhode Island; Poarch Band of
Creek Indians, Alabama; Gay Head Wampanoag Indian Tribe, Massachusetts; San Juan
Southern Paiute Tribe, Arizona; Mohegan Tribe, Connecticut; Jena Band of Choctaw Indi-
ans, Louisiana; Huron Potawatomi, Inc., Michigan; Samish Indian Tribe, Washington;
Match-e-be-nash-she-wish Band of Pottawatomie Indians, Michigan; Snoqualmie Tribe,
Washingion; Cowlitz Indian Tribe, Washington; and Mashpee Wampanoag Tribe,
Massachusetts.







44 Id. at 1061-62.
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It took longer for the Tribe to regain its sovereign status in the form of
federal recognition.  For nearly three centuries, the Tribe had a tumultuous rela-
tionship with the federal government.  Between 1927 and 1937, the federal
government did not consider the Tribe to be under its jurisdiction at all, but
only under the jurisdiction of the State of Rhode Island.48  In the absence of
federal recognition, the Tribe was precluded from seeking or receiving any
form of federal assistance.
In 1983, the Tribe’s nearly two-hundred-year-long quest for federal recog-
nition of its sovereign status reached a successful conclusion, when the United
States formally recognized the Tribe.49  Upon receiving federal recognition, the
Tribe became eligible for the bundle of rights and federal benefits the IRA
reserves for federally recognized tribes.  One of these is the ability to petition
the Secretary of the Interior to take land into trust for the benefit of the Tribe.
Five years later, in 1988, the Secretary of the Interior accepted into trust the
Tribe’s 1,800 acres of Charlestown-area land, thus completing the Tribe’s long-
awaited restoration of its sovereign status and tribal lands.50
2. An Unexpected Attack on the Narragansett’s Tribal Status and
Tribal Lands
In 1991, the Tribe again attempted to exercise the IRA right to acquire
reservation lands.  The Tribe petitioned the Secretary of the Interior to take into
trust an additional thirty-one acres adjacent to its existing reservation.51  The
Narragansett had purchased this additional land to build low-income housing.52
But disputes arose among the Tribe, the Town of Charlestown, and Bureau of
Indian Affairs (“BIA”) officials about the applicability of local building regula-
tions in what would become “Indian country” were the trust acquisition to be
completed.53  Notwithstanding the dispute, the Secretary of the Interior took
the land into trust for the Tribe in 1998.54  Rhode Island’s anti-gaming gover-
nor was keenly aware that the Secretary’s land-into-trust acquisition on behalf
of the Tribe paved the way, under the IGRA, for the Tribe to conduct casino
gaming on the additional thirty-one acres.55  Rhode Island therefore immedi-
48 Id. at 1061.
49 Id. at 1062 (citing Final Determination for Fed. Acknowledgement of Narragansett Tribe
of Rhode Island, 48 Fed. Reg. 6,177 (Feb. 20, 1983)).
50 Id. (citing Town of Charlestown, Rhode Island v. E. Area Dir., Bur. of Indian Affairs, 18
IBIA 67, 69 (1989)).
51 Id.
52 Id. at 1072 n.2 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
53 Id.
54 Id. at 1062.
55 Donald L. Carcieri, whose name has since become a household word in Indian Country
and to Indian and gaming law practitioners, has made no secret of his opposition to gaming.
Five years before the Supreme Court’s decision in Carcieri, he decried the purportedly “dev-
astating” effects of casino gaming on Rhode Island’s infrastructure, notwithstanding the
$215 million in revenue that the State had received until that point from its Lincoln Park and
Newport Grand casinos.  Donald L. Carcieri, Governor, State of Rhode Island, State of the
State Message (Feb. 3, 2004), available at www.governor.ri.gov/other/statemessage04.php
(last visited Apr. 14, 2010).  In the same address, Governor Carcieri made his now-famous
statement:  “We are already too dependent on gambling revenue.  If we continue, we will
soon be owned by them.” Id.
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ately challenged the acquisition, first in an administrative hearing, then before
the District Court for the District of Rhode Island.56
Both the Interior Board of Indian Appeals (“IBIA”) and the District Court
upheld the Secretary’s land-into-trust decision.57  The District Court reasoned
that the Tribe fulfilled both of the IRA’s eligibility criteria for exercising its
right, under the IRA, to have land taken into trust.58  Like the Secretary, the
District Court assumed “now under federal jurisdiction” meant “currently under
federal jurisdiction.”  The court reasoned that the Tribe was both “currently
‘federally recognized’ and ‘existed at the time of the enactment of the IRA.’”59
Because these two criteria were fulfilled, the District Court found the Secre-
tary’s decision to take the additional land into trust on behalf of the Tribe was
squarely in line with his statutory authority.60
The First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the ruling of the Rhode Island
District Court.61  In reaching its holding, the First Circuit noted the ambiguity
in the language of the IRA’s grant of authority to the Secretary — specifically
with regard to the term “now” in Section 479 of the IRA.62  Based on this
ambiguity, the Circuit Court deferred to the Secretary’s interpretation of the
statute.63  While a defensible position to the contrary also existed, the Circuit
Court reasoned that the Secretary’s decision was not inconsistent with past
Department practice on similar matters.64  Even had the Secretary’s decision
represented a departure from past Department practice, the Circuit Court held
that it should still be affirmed based on the Secretary’s “reasoned explanation
for his interpretation.”65
The State appealed this third defeat to the United States Supreme Court.
The Supreme Court granted certiorari based on the ambiguity inherent in the
statutory language and to resolve the key issue of the Secretary’s authority to
take land into trust for tribes that were not under federal jurisdiction in 1934.66
In a 6-to-3 opinion, the Supreme Court reversed the First Circuit and held that
the Secretary does not have the authority to take land into trust for tribes that
were not federally recognized in 1934.67  Because the Narragansett were under
state, not federal, jurisdiction in 1934, the Court held that the Secretary lacked
the power to take the challenged land into trust for the Tribe.68  When the
Supreme Court issued its decision on February 24, 2009, the State was quick to





61 Id. (citing Carcieri v. Norton, 423 F.3d 45, 71 (1st Cir. 2005), aff’d. en banc, Carcieri v.
Kempthorne, 497 F.3d 15 (1st Cir. 2007)).
62 Kempthorne, 497 F.3d at 26.
63 Id. at 26, 30 (citing Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837,
843 (1984) (setting forth guidelines for appellate review of agency interpretations of inher-
ently ambiguous statutory language)).
64 Id. at 34.
65 Id.
66 Carcieri, 129 S.Ct. at 1061.
67 Id. at 1065, 1068.
68 Id. at 1068.
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register approval, calling it “a victory for the state of Rhode Island and the
Town of Charlestown.”69
III. THE SUPREME COURT’S REDEFINITION:  “NOW” MEANS “1934”
Carcieri was handed down as a fractured opinion with a concurrence, a
dissent, and a combined concurrence and dissent.  The majority opinion was
written by Justice Thomas, and joined by Justices Alito, Breyer, Kennedy, and
Scalia.70  Justice Breyer authored a separate concurrence, in which he “join[ed]
the Court’s opinion with three qualifications.”71  Justice Souter, joined by Jus-
tice Ginsburg, separately concurred with Justice Breyer in part, and dissented in
part.72  Justice Stevens dissented.73
This article is not intended as an in-depth analysis of the various positions
and supporting rationales forwarded by the justices.  Instead, the focus of the
discussion is on the remedial measures that have been proposed as a result of
Carcieri.  Accordingly, this article discusses only the majority opinion and Jus-
tice Breyer’s concurrence.  Together, these have spawned most of the discus-
sion and “Carcieri Fix” proposals.
A. The Majority’s Past-Tense Reading of “Now” Precludes Narragansett
Recognition
The holding of the Carcieri majority is based on principles of statutory
construction, without regard for the policy arguments forwarded by the parties
and amici.74  The Supreme Court was faced with the task of determining
whether the phrase “now under federal jurisdiction” refers to the time that Con-
gress enacted the IRA, or to the date on which the Secretary accepts a parcel of
land into trust.75  Justice Thomas, writing for the majority, held that the word
“now” in the IRA phrase “now under federal jurisdiction” unambiguously
refers to the time that the IRA was enacted.76  In support of its holding, the
Court first noted that in the 1930s, the word “now” was defined, in part, as “at
the present time.”77  Justice Thomas pointed to Congress’ use of the term
“hereafter” to refer to future events in other IRA provisions as evidence of
Congress’ intent that the word “now” in Section 479 be read as referring to
1934 when the IRA was enacted.78  The majority further relied on the interpre-
69 Press Release, State of Rhode Island, Office of the Governor, Governor Carcieri and
Attorney General Lynch Comment on United Supreme Court Decision in Carcieri v. Salazar
(Feb. 24, 2009), http://www.ri.gov/GOVERNOR/view.php?id=8300 (last visited Apr. 14,
2010).
70 Carcieri, 129 S.Ct. at 1060.
71 Id. at 1068 (Breyer, J., concurring).
72 Id. at 1071 (Souter, J., & Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
73 Id. at 1072 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
74 Id. at 1066-67.
75 Id. at 1061.
76 Id. at 1065.
77 Id. at 1064.
78 Id. at 1065 (citing 25 U.S.C. § 468 (referring to Indian reservations “now existing or
established hereafter”)).
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tation of John Collier, one of the authors of the IRA.79  In a 1936 letter, Collier
wrote that the definition of “Indian” refers to members of tribes federally rec-
ognized “at the date of the Act.”80
On behalf of the majority, Justice Thomas rejected all of the Secretary’s
arguments that “now” is an ambiguous term.81  First, he addressed the Secre-
tary’s determination that “now” is ambiguous because it can reasonably be
interpreted to mean at the time of enactment or at the time of application.82
The Court dismissed this semantics-based reasoning.  In keeping with the
“plain meaning” canon of construction, Justice Thomas asserted that if Con-
gress had intended “now” to mean “at the time of a tribe’s application for fed-
eral recognition,” it could have expressly stated this.83
Second, the Court addressed the alleged ambiguity in Congress’ choice of
the words “shall include” in Section 479 to define who is an “Indian.”84
According to Justice Thomas, this word choice is not ambiguous because Con-
gress expressly included three distinct definitions of the word.85  The Court
characterized the language of Section 479 as clear and unambiguous.86  For this
reason, the Court considered it unnecessary to evaluate policy considerations
and ignored the competing policy arguments raised by each side in the brief-
ings.87  The majority also rejected the Secretary’s argument that the broader
definition of “tribe” in Section 479 nullifies the narrower definition of “Indian”
in the same statute.88  Instead, the Court reasoned that a tribe is necessarily an
“Indian tribe.”89  Thus, the definition of an “Indian” and the Court’s interpreta-
tion of “now under federal jurisdiction” are controlling.90
Finally, the majority held that the Indian Land Consolidation Act
(“ILCA”) does not provide an independent source of authority permitting the
Secretary to take the challenged land into trust for tribes that were not recog-
nized in 1934.91  The Court held that the ILCA’s protections are only applica-
ble for Indians or tribes that fall within the definition of Indian in Section 479,
but opted out of the IRA after its enactment.92
79 Id. at 1065 & n.5.
80 Id. at 1065.
81 Id. at 1066.
82 Id.
83 See id. (“Here, the statutory context makes clear that ‘now’ does not mean ‘now or here-
after’ or ‘at the time of application.’ Had Congress intended to legislate such a definition, it
could have done so explicitly, as it did in §§ 468 and 472, or it could have omitted the word
‘now’ altogether.”).
84 Id. at 1066.  Pursuant to Section 465, the Secretary has authority to acquire land and hold
it in trust “for the purpose of providing land for Indians.”  25 U.S.C. § 465 (2010).  Section
479 defines “Indian,” for purposes of the Secretary’s Section 465 authority, to “include all
persons of Indian descent who are members of any recognized tribe now under Federal
jurisdiction.”  25 U.S.C. § 479 (2010).
85 Carcieri, 129 S.Ct. at 1066.
86 See id.
87 Id. at 1066-67.
88 Id. at 1067.
89 Id.
90 See id. at 1068.
91 Id. at 1067.
92 Id. at 1068.
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B. The Concurrence’s Flexible Interpretation of “Now” Suggests Potential
Ambiguity
Justice Breyer concurred in the majority opinion that the Narragansett
were beyond the reach of the Department’s authority to take land into trust, but
authored a separate concurrence supplying three qualifications.93  Justice
Breyer agreed with the majority interpretation of “now” in Section 479 as
meaning in 1934.94  But Justice Breyer did not share Justice Thomas’ convic-
tion that “the statute’s language by itself is determinative” and even allowed
that the statutory language might be ambiguous.95
Even though Justice Breyer agreed with the Court’s refusal to accord the
Department’s interpretation of the statute the customary deference,96 his con-
currence hinted at the possibility that tribes may be able to benefit from the
land-into-trust process by showing that they were under federal jurisdiction in
1934 even if the federal government did not know it at the time.97  Justice
Breyer explained his proposition by noting that in 1934, the federal government
created a list of 258 tribes covered by the IRA, yet several tribes were incor-
rectly left off the list.98  Later, the federal government “recognized some of
th[e]se tribes on grounds that showed that it should have recognized them in
1934 even though it did not.”99
Further, Justice Breyer pointed out that Section 479 does not impose a
temporal limitation on federal recognition.100  He cited several examples of
tribes whose later recognition demonstrates earlier jurisdiction.101  Unlike these
tribes, the Narragansett were unable to demonstrate significant contact with the
federal government until the 1970s.102  In Justice Breyer’s view, it was this
lack of a demonstrable relationship with the federal government that distin-
guished the Narragansett from the subset of tribes whose later recognition sug-
gested earlier federal jurisdiction.103  Based on the factual circumstances of the
Narragansetts’ history, Justice Breyer concurred in the majority’s holding with
regard to that specific Tribe.104
For the most part, Justice Breyer’s reasoning was in accord with that of the
majority.  He agreed with the methodology of the Court’s reasoning that “now”
93 Id. at 1068 (Breyer, J., concurring).
94 Id. at 1069.
95 Id. at 1068–69.
96 See id. at 1069 (citing Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S.
837 (1984)). Chevron stands for the proposition that courts generally defer to agency inter-
pretations of ambiguous statutory language in statutes that the agency has been charged with
interpreting.  Justice Breyer also cited Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944), hold-
ing that “an agency’s greater knowledge of the circumstances in which a statute was
enacted,” lends greater weight to the agency’s construction of statutory language and calls
for courts to pay due respect to agency interpretations and determinations based thereupon.
Carcieri, 129 S.Ct. at 1069 (Breyer, J., concurring).
97 Carcieri, 129 S.Ct. at 1069 (Breyer, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
98 Id.
99 Id. at 1070.
100 Id.
101 Id.
102 Id. at 1070-71.
103 Id. at 1070.
104 Id. at 1071.
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means “1934.”105  While recognizing that courts reviewing agency determina-
tions generally defer, under the Chevron principle, to agency interpretation of
the statute, Justice Breyer did not consider the Department’s determination as
to the Narragansett to be entitled to such deference.106  In the Narragansetts’
case, the Department’s determination that “now” means “currently” is contrary
to the Department’s earlier decision, in 1934, to adopt the same position and
interpretation of “now” as that enunciated by the Carcieri majority.107  Further,
nothing in the legislative history of the IRA suggests that Congress intended for
the Department to have interpretive power over the Act’s temporal
limitations.108
Despite Justice Breyer’s concurrence in the majority holding, three qualifi-
cations set his reasoning apart from that of Justice Thomas.  Most significantly,
Justice Breyer raised the possibility that “now” is susceptible to multiple mean-
ings.109  While he concurred with the majority that historical sources, including
Collier’s letter, indicate Congress likely intended “now” to be interpreted as
“1934,” Justice Breyer pointed out that, for many newly recognized tribes, fed-
eral recognition after 1934 is often predicated on evidence of earlier federal
jurisdiction.110  In support of his theory that “now” as used in Section 479
could have multiple meanings, Justice Breyer noted that both the Secretary’s
and the Governor’s conflicting interpretations have support in precedent.111
While concurring in the majority’s holding that “now” means 1934, Jus-
tice Breyer reached this conclusion by a slightly different path.  Unlike the
majority’s rationale, which relies on canons of statutory construction, Justice
Breyer’s analysis focuses on the legislative history of the IRA.  In Justice
Breyer’s view, the Act’s legislative history indicated Congress’ express intent
to empower the Secretary to take land into trust for Tribes that “already had the
kinds of obligations that the words ‘under Federal jurisdiction’ imply.”112  Like
the majority, Justice Breyer also took note of John Collier’s 1936 letter to
Department superintendents and considered the letter to be further evidence
demonstrating congressional intent for the IRA to apply to tribes recognized in
1934.113
Most importantly, Justice Breyer reasoned that some tribes may nonethe-
less be able to take advantage of the IRA’s land-into-trust mechanism by show-
ing that they were under federal jurisdiction in 1934 even if the federal
government did not know it at the time.114  His concurrence raised the possibil-




109 Id. at 1068-69.
110 Id. at 1068-70.
111 Id. at 1068-69.
112 Id. at 1069 (citing Hearings on S. 2755 et al.:  A Bill to Grant to Indians Living Under
Federal Tutelage the Freedom to Organize for Purposes of Local Self-Government and Eco-
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ity that a tribe’s “later recognition reflects earlier ‘Federal jurisdiction.’”115  If
so, the Court’s narrow interpretation may “prove [to be] somewhat less restric-
tive than it at first appears.”116
While the federal government’s 1934 list identified 258 tribes as covered
by the IRA, Justice Breyer noted that several other tribes were incorrectly left
off the list — even though they were federally recognized at that time.117
Later, the government formally recognized some of these tribes “on grounds
that showed that it should have recognized them in 1934 even though it did
not.”118
One such tribe, the Stillaguamish Tribe, was not federally recognized until
1976.119  Nonetheless, one of the reasons cited in support of the Tribe’s 1976
belated recognition was the fact that it had enjoyed continuous treaty rights
with the United States since 1855.120  Other tribes, such as the Grand Traverse
Band of Ottawa and Chippewa Indians, were not recognized in 1934, because
the government erroneously believed the tribes had dissolved, but were later
acknowledged as having existed continuously since 1675.121  Still other tribes,
like the Mole Lake Tribe, were denied recognition in 1934 based on faulty
studies which found those tribes no longer existed.122  Only later did the
Department disavow the faulty determination and grant the Mole Lake Tribe
federal recognition as a separate tribe.123  Such a reversal of administrative
practice, in Justice Breyer’s view, evidenced the Department’s recognition of a
continuous and ongoing jurisdictional connection with the federal government
dating from at least 1934.124  Further, this administrative practice evidenced the
Department’s implied understanding that there was no temporal limitation on
which groups may be federally recognized as “Indian” or a “tribe” for purposes
of the Secretary’s authority to take land into trust on behalf of Indian tribes.125
For the Narragansett, however, Justice Breyer’s flexible reading of “now”
is of little, if any, help.  Justice Breyer distinguished the Narragansett from
tribes like the Stillaguamish, the Grand Traverse Band of Ottawa and Chippewa
Indians, and the Mole Lake Tribe because of the Narragansetts’ lack of signifi-
cant contact with the federal government prior to the 1970s.126  In Justice
Breyer’s reading, the undisputed facts in the Carcieri record made it clear that
in 1934, the Narragansett were under the jurisdiction of the State of Rhode
Island alone, and not of the federal government.127  The Tribe lacked any his-
115 Id. at 1070.  It is worth noting that Justice Souter, writing in dissent, joined by Justice
Ginsberg, expressly pointed out that recognition and jurisdiction “may be given separate
content.” Id. at 1071 (Souter, J., & Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
116 Id. at 1069.
117 Id.








126 Id. at 1070-71.
127 Id. at 1070.
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tory of enjoying treaty relations with the federal government in 1934, receiving
congressional appropriations prior to 1934, or being enrolled with the Indian
Office as of 1934.128  In the absence of these or similar indicia of past federal
recognition or jurisdiction, the Narragansett Tribe was unable to show that any
later recognition by the federal government also reflected federal jurisdiction in
1934.  As a result, at least in Justice Breyer’s assessment, these considerations
supported the majority’s holding, even if they did not support the rationale for
reaching that holding.129
IV. POST-CARCIERI:  A FIRESTORM OF RESPONSES
The impact of the High Court’s decision in Carcieri on those in the world
of federal Indian and gaming law was the equivalent of the “shot heard round
the world.”  No sooner had the ink dried on the newly published slip opinion
when speculation broke out among leaders of gaming and non-gaming Indian
tribes; business leaders; attorneys; legal scholars; federal, state, and tribal offi-
cials; lawmakers; and commentators about its future impact on gaming in
Indian Country.  Within months, both Houses of Congress held hearings to
address the potential fall-out of the decision and consider possible legislative
responses.  In nationwide formal consultation sessions with Department offi-
cials, tribal leaders also urged the executive branch to take quick and decisive
agency action.
A. Hearings in the House Committee on Natural Resources:  The Impact of
Carcieri is “Unknown”
On April 1, 2009, the House Committee on Natural Resources held a hear-
ing on the ramifications of Carcieri for tribes.130  The Chairman of the Com-
mittee, Nick J. Rahall (D-WV), opened the hearing by noting that the full
impact of Carcieri remains unknown.131  Rahall speculated that eventually,
Carcieri’s impact could extend well beyond the realm of Indian gaming, poten-
tially exposing virtually every tribe to frivolous legal challenges regarding their
status.132  Given the social and economic problems faced by many tribes today,
and the fact that land is an essential part of sovereignty, Chairman Rahall stated
that the federal government has a moral as well as legal duty to Native Ameri-
cans to rectify the situation.133  Ranking Committee member, Doc Hastings (R-
WA), urged Congress to not sidestep its responsibility to tribes.134  According
to Hastings, the Supreme Court’s insistence that the authority to recognize
tribes and take land into trust rests with Congress underscores Congress’ duty
128 Id.  Justice Breyer suggested that these grounds for later recognition – a treaty in effect
in 1934, a pre-1934 congressional appropriation, or enrollment with the Indian Office as of
1934 – “could be described as jurisdictional.” Id.
129 Id. at 1071.
130 See Ramifications Hearing, supra note 3.
131 Id. at 2 (statement of Nick J. Rahall, Chairman, Committee on Natural Resources).
132 Id. at 2.
133 Id. at 1-2.
134 Id. at 3 (statement of Doc Hastings, Ranking Member, Committee on Natural
Resources).
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to safeguard tribal interests.135  In light of the Court’s reasoning, any action
responsive to Carcieri must come from Congress.136  The witnesses selected to
testify included Colette Routel,137 Michael J. Anderson,138 and Donald Craig
Mitchell.139
1. Professor Colette Routel:  Potentially Divisive Effects on Tribes
Professor Routel’s testimony flowed from the premise that, because so
many federal benefits are directly tied to federal recognition under the IRA, the
Carcieri Court’s reading of the statute will essentially create two classes of
Indians, “the haves and the have nots.”140  As many commentators have recog-
nized, one key benefit that will be out of reach for recently recognized tribes is
the ability to petition the Secretary of the Interior to take land into trust for
gaming or other economic development purposes.  The IRA also provides spe-
cifically for the establishment of tribal constitutions, tribal businesses, and
Indian preferences in hiring.  The Supreme Court’s construction of the statute
would preclude recently recognized tribes from taking advantage of these bene-
fits as well.141  Beyond the benefits available under the IRA, Congress has
linked other federal benefits, including various funding mechanisms, to the def-
inition of “Indian” in Section 479.  In the aftermath of the Supreme Court’s
decision, tribes that do not meet the Carcieri definition of Indian will not be
able to take advantage of these benefits either.142
Professor Routel began by explaining that federal recognition of a tribe
essentially means the initiation of a government-to-government relationship
between the tribe and the federal government.  Prior to the IRA, there was no
definition of “Indian” or “tribe,” and, as a consequence, the IRA-style govern-
ment-to-government relationship was not available to tribes.  During this
135 Id.
136 Id.
137 At the time she testified before the House Committee, Professor Routel was a visiting
assistant professor at the University of Michigan Law School. Id. at 5.  Prior to this position,
she practiced Indian law, first at Faegre & Benson in Minneapolis, Minnesota, then at the
Indian law boutique firm of Jacobson, Buffalo, Magnuson, Anderson & Hogen in St. Paul,
Minnesota.  University of Michigan Law School Faculty & Staff, Colette Routel, http://
web.law.umich.edu/_FacultyBioPage/facultybiopagenew.asp?ID=414 (last visited Apr. 14,
2010).
138 At the time of his testimony regarding Carcieri, Mr. Anderson was a partner with the
Washington, D.C. law firm of AndersonTuell, LLP. Ramifications Hearing, supra note 3, at
12 (statement of Michael J. Anderson).  From 1993 to 2001, respectively, Mr. Anderson
served as the Associate Solicitor for Indian Affairs and the Deputy Assistant Secretary for
Indian Affairs. Id.
139 Donald Craig Mitchell, an attorney in Anchorage, Alaska, has written extensively on
Alaskan history and Native Alaskan issues.  Mitchell is the author of SOLD AMERICAN: THE
STORY OF ALASKA NATIVES AND THEIR LAND and TAKE MY LAND TAKE MY LIFE: THE
STORY OF CONGRESS’ HISTORICAL SETTLEMENT OF ALASKA NATIVE LAND CLAIMS, both of
which were recognized in 2006 by the Alaska Historical Society as being among the most
important books written on Alaskan history. Ramifications Hearing, supra note 3, at 25
(statement of Donald Craig Mitchell).  Between 1977 and 1993, Mitchell served as vice-
president and general counsel for the Alaska Federation of Natives. Id.
140 Ramifications Hearing, supra note 3, at 7 (statement of Colette Routel).
141 Id. at 6-7.
142 Id.
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period, the status of Indians and Indian tribes was in flux.  Further, before the
IRA was enacted, federal Indian policy was targeted towards assimilating tribe
members into the majority culture.  As an indirect consequence of this policy,
many tribes passed in and out of federal recognition based on the majority
culture’s perception of tribe members’ civilized nature.143
Given this uncertainty regarding recognition status, courts have generally
deferred to agency determinations regarding the status of a particular tribe.144
It has been standard practice over the past several decades for courts to pattern
their recognition holdings to conform to the executive’s decisions once the
executive branch made a determination.145  But Carcieri’s majority did not fol-
low this long-established practice.  Instead, the Carcieri Court affirmatively
overruled the Secretary of the Interior’s interpretation of “now” as denoting the
time of application for benefits.146  In so doing, the Court also overrode regula-
tions the Department promulgated to govern tribal recognition
determinations.147
Finally, Professor Routel pointed out that the legislative history of the IRA
does not support a rigid definition of “Indian” being fixed in 1934.148  In fact,
because one of the IRA’s primary drafters expressed concern about passing a
law that unnecessarily placed Indians under federal supervision, the definition
of “Indian” ultimately codified in the IRA was specifically intended to be fluid.
This fluidity was intended to avoid asserting government control over individu-
als and tribes that were, and are, capable of acting for themselves.149  Accord-
ing to Professor Routel, the Supreme Court, by rigidly fixing the definition of
Indian to those under federal jurisdiction in 1934, overtly ignores this concern
and strips the Secretary of the Interior of his discretion to determine the status
of the tribe at the time the tribe applies for benefits under the IRA.150
2. Michael J. Anderson:  Implicit Contravention of a Legislative
Mandate
The testimony of former Associate Solicitor for Indian Affairs and former
Deputy Assistant Secretary for Indian Affairs, Michael Anderson, went beyond
Professor Routel’s focus on the IRA’s legislative history to the broader histori-
cal context of the Carcieri holding.  Anderson began by noting the irony of the
143 Id. at 8-9.
144 Id. at 8.
145 Id. at 8 (citing, among others, United States v. Holliday, 70 U.S. 407, 418 (1865), for the
proposition that once an executive or political department recognizes Indians as a tribe, the
courts must do the same).
146 Id. (statement of Colette Routel).
147 Id. at 6, 12.
148 Id. at 9-11.
149 Id. (citing extensive testimony between Commissioner of Indian Affairs, John Collier,
and the Chairman of the Senate Indian Affairs Committee, Burton Wheeler, discussing con-
cerns in six hearings in 1934 that the IRA should not be used to benefit people capable of
handling their own affairs, such as some Indians are when they become fully assimilated).
The issue between Collier and Wheeler appears to have been finding some balance between
protecting Indians from arbitrary decisions about IRA benefits versus keeping individuals
capable of handling their own affairs under government control.
150 Id. at 11.
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fact that the IRA was originally enacted in order to reverse the damaging
effects of assimilation.151  The High Court’s holding in Carcieri, according to
Anderson, is directly contrary to long-supported congressional policy of
encouraging and promoting self-determination among Indian nations.152
Anderson, agreeing with Professor Routel that the Carcieri majority
ignored the longstanding judicial tradition of deference to determinations made
by the Executive, accused the Carcieri majority of ignoring Congress’ 1994
Amendment to the IRA.153  As a practical matter, this Amendment requires that
all tribes be accorded equal treatment under the law relative to other Tribes.154
Anderson asserted that Congress’ broad authority over Indian tribes, stemming
directly from the Indian Commerce Clause in the Constitution, demands a
broad interpretation of “under federal jurisdiction” in the IRA as well.155  If
Congress intended to limit the application of the IRA, it would have done so
explicitly and, absent such language, the statute should be interpreted based on
the broad scope of Congress’ constitutional authority over Indian tribes.156  To
further complicate the picture, Anderson asserted that, as a practical matter, the
Department is “ill-equipped” to interpret what it means to be “under federal
jurisdiction in 1934.”157  The Department lacks the necessary resources to do a
case-by-case evaluation of what the phrase means for each tribe applying for
benefits.158  The Department also has a history of “unduly restrictive interpreta-
tions” of the IRA that are inconsistent with the intent of the IRA to reverse
assimilation policies and promote tribal self-governance and determination.159
Anderson’s testimony proved to be one of the more vociferous early criti-
cisms of the Carcieri holding.  His argument became a springboard for later
criticism of Carcieri, as well as a template for proposals on how the Carcieri
holding’s potentially detrimental effects on tribal interests could be mitigated
by legislative solutions.
151 Id. at 15 (statement of Michael J. Anderson).
152 Id.
153 Id.
154 Id. (quoting 25 U.S.C. § 476(f) (2004)).  The Amendment prohibits departments and
agencies from enacting regulations or making decisions pursuant to the IRA if the conse-
quence of those actions is to enhance or diminish the privileges and immunities of a feder-
ally recognized tribe relative to other federally recognized tribes — simply by virtue of the
former tribe’s status as an Indian tribe.  25 U.S.C. § 476(f) (2004).  The legislative history of
this Amendment includes a statement by Senator John McCain (R-AZ) noting that the pur-
pose of the Amendment was to clarify that the IRA was not intended to allow the Secretary
of the Interior to create categories of Indian tribes. Ramifications Hearing, supra note 3, at
21 (statement of Michael J. Anderson).  Although the statutory language of the Amendment
is specifically directed at the executive, not the judicial branch of the federal government, it
is implied in Anderson’s position that the High Court’s Carcieri holding would force execu-
tive branch officials to act in contravention of the Congressional mandate.
155 Ramifications Hearing, supra note 3, at 16 (statement of Michael J. Anderson) (citing,
in part, Joint Tribal Council of the Passamaquoddy Tribe v. Morton, 528 F.2d 370 (1st Cir.
1975), for the proposition that an unrecognized tribe can be under federal jurisdiction for the
purposes of the Trade and Intercourse Act).
156 Id. at 15, 17.
157 Id.
158 Id.
159 Id. at 17-18.
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3. Donald Craig Mitchell:  Consternation Over Carcieri Is Due To
Misguided Expectations
Unlike Anderson, Donald Craig Mitchell, Alaska attorney and author,
directly challenged the long-standing federal policy related to the Department’s
delegated authority with respect to tribes and their relationship with the federal
government.  In his testimony before the House Committee, Mitchell vigor-
ously defended the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the phrase “now under
federal jurisdiction” as including only tribes that were federally recognized in
1934.160  According to Mitchell, the only reason Carcieri caused turmoil in
Indian Country was that, since 1934, eighty-eight of the 104 tribes created by
the Secretary of the Interior were made outside the scope of his authority.161
Because these 104 tribes “were neither [officially] ‘recognized’ nor ‘under Fed-
eral jurisdiction’ on the date the 73[rd] Congress enacted the IRA,” Mitchell
asserted, “the Secretary had no authority pursuant to section 5 of the IRA to
acquire land for any of those tribes.”162  Mitchell criticized the Department’s
post-1934 actions with regard to creating federally recognized tribes and
acquiring land for them as “ultra vires final agency action” that effectively
usurped Congress’ power.163
Mitchell asserted that Carcieri presents a golden opportunity for Congress
to reclaim its authority regarding Indian Affairs from the Department.  In the
aftermath of Carcieri, “it is time for Congress to reassert its commerce clause
authority to once again be in charge of the nation’s Indian policies.”164  Mitch-
ell viewed the Supreme Court’s holding as highlighting the need for Congress
to reestablish its position vis-a`-vis the BIA, with respect to congressional ple-
nary authority over Indian tribes.165  In so doing, according to Mitchell, the
Court paved the way for Congress to reexamine the scope of authority it
intends to delegate to the Department and determine whether the Secretary of
the Interior should be authorized to designate new tribes.166  After this issue
has been settled, Congress should make a separate determination as to whether
the Secretary should continue to take land into trust over the objections of local
governmental entities in the communities surrounding the area where the land
is situated.167
160 Id. at 26 (statement of Donald Craig Mitchell).
161 Id. at 27.  Mitchell’s prepared testimony refers to the eighty-eight tribes accorded recog-
nition by the Department as “ersatz ‘federally recognized tribes.’” Id. at 29.
162 Id. at 27, 29.
163 Id. at 27.  Mitchell’s testimony further criticized the United States Supreme Court’s
ruling in Carcieri, which affirmed the Department’s recognition of the Narragansett Tribe,
as “beyond its jurisdiction and in . . . violat[ion] of the Doctrine of Separation of Powers.”
Id. at 15, 27.
164 Id. at 25.
165 Id. at 30.
166 Id. at 29–30.
167 Id. at 30.
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B. Hearings before the Senate Committee on Indian Affairs:  Suggested
Legislative Responses To Carcieri
On May 21, 2009, the United States Senate Committee on Indian Affairs
held a hearing to examine the authority of the executive branch in the aftermath
of the High Court’s holding to acquire land in trust on behalf of Indian tribes.
Committee Chairman Byron Dorgan (D-ND), Vice Chairman John Barrasso
(R-WY), and other Committee members presided over the hearing.  The wit-
nesses selected to testify included Edward P. Lazarus,168 W. Ron Allen,169 and
Lawrence Long.170
The stated purpose of the Senate hearing was twofold.  The Committee
sought first to determine the effect, if any, of the ruling on tribes, and secondly,
to evaluate whether any action might be required by Congress to remedy or
mitigate any undesirable effects to tribes and what form such action might
take.171  Since the hearing, these potential legislative remedies have been
dubbed “Carcieri Fixes” by scholars, legislators, and media commentators.
1. Edward P. Lazarus:  Five Legislative Options
Lazarus began his testimony to the Senate Committee by highlighting the
urgency of implementing a legislative or regulatory “fix” in the aftermath of
Carcieri.  This urgency, according to Lazarus, arises from the fact that a tribe’s
ability to have land taken into trust on its behalf is key to tribal sovereignty.
The land-into-trust mechanism is designed to provide tribes the opportunity to
control their own homelands.172  Because the land-into-trust mechanism
enhances tribal sovereignty and preserves it from erosion, any judicial (or legis-
lative) action that diminishes the scope of a tribe’s ability to acquire reservation
lands effectively undermines the sovereignty of the tribe in question.  Accord-
ingly, to the extent that the Carcieri holding weakens the Department’s author-
ity to take lands into trust on a tribe’s behalf—even if only a handful of tribes
168 Lazarus is nationally renowned for his experience in appellate and Supreme Court litiga-
tion.  At the time of his Senate testimony, Lazarus was a partner at the law firm of Akin
Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld and co-head of the firm’s litigation practice. Hearing to
Examine Executive Branch Authority to Acquire Trust Lands for Indian Tribes, Before the S.
Comm. On Indian Affairs, 111th Cong. 1 (2009) (testimony of Edward P. Lazarus), available
at http://indian.senate.gov/public/_files/Lazarustestimony.pdf (last visited Apr. 14, 2010)
[hereinafter Lazarus Testimony].
169 Allen serves as the Chief Executive Officer for the Jamestown S’Klallam Tribe.  James-
town S’Klallam Tribe – Administration, http://www.jamestowntribe.org/jstweb_2007/
programs/admin_main.htm (last visited Apr. 14, 2010).  He was asked to testify before the
Senate Committee in his capacity as Secretary for the National Congress of American Indi-
ans (“NCAI”). Press Release, Senate Indian Affairs Committee To Hold Hearing On Land
Into Trust Authority (May 20, 2009), available at http://indian.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?
FuseAction=PressReleases.Detail&PressRelease_id=68b376ed-560b-441c-b873-649aefe546
36&Month=5&Year=2009 (last visited Apr. 14, 2010).
170 Long is the Immediate Past Chair of the Western Conference of Attorneys General
(“CWAG”) and was asked to testify before the Senate Committee in that capacity.  Press
Release, Senate Indian Affairs Committee, supra note 170.  He is the former Attorney Gen-
eral for the State of South Dakota.  Larry Long, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Larry_Long
(last visited Apr. 14, 2010).
171 Press Release, Senate Indian Affairs Committee, supra note 170.
172 Lazarus Testimony, supra note 168, at 1-2.
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are affected—it constitutes a direct attack on tribal sovereignty and self-
determination.
Lazarus identified five options available to the federal government for
clarifying the statutory language of the IRA so as to neutralize Carcieri’s poten-
tial to wreak havoc on tribal sovereignty.  His proposed measures include: (1) a
congressional amendment to the IRA, “by deleting the word ‘now,’ or other-
wise clarifying” the meaning behind the troubling phrase “now under federal
jurisdiction” (along with ratifying all pre-Carcieri decisions by the Depart-
ment);173 (2) the Department’s continued exercise of its administrative author-
ity to determine whether a particular tribe that was not “recognized” prior to
1934 was, nonetheless, “under federal jurisdiction” in 1934;174 (3) the Depart-
ment’s  continued exercise of its administrative authority in taking land into
trust under a second, entirely separate mechanism in Section 479, on behalf of
Indians and/or communities of Indians who are “of one-half of more Indian”
descent;175 (4) the Department’s continued use of its statutory authority to take
excess federal land into trust so long as the land in question is within the
boundaries of an Indian reservation;176 and ultimately,  (5)  a determination of
whether the President has independent authority to take land into trust for
Indian tribes.177  While any of these measures, by itself, would be somewhat
effective in clarifying the confusion generated by the High Court’s holding,
optimal protection of tribal sovereignty would be achieved by implementing all
five, at least to some degree.
The first Carcieri Fix proposed by Lazarus would require direct congres-
sional action on two fronts.  The core congressional action required would be
an actual amendment to the language of the IRA by removing the word “now”
from the phrase “now under federal jurisdiction.”178  Such an amendment
would “correct the statutory construction issue that led to the Carcieri deci-
sion.”179  So amended, the plain language of the Act would clearly and unam-
biguously authorize the Department to take land into trust on behalf of any
tribe “under federal jurisdiction” without regard to temporal constraints.180
Second, in connection with the statutory amendment, Congress would
need to ratify, by legislative fiat, all pre-Carcieri land-into-trust decisions
made by the Department.181  Failure to do so, Lazarus warned, would effec-
tively “[l]eav[e] all of those decisions in legal limbo, undoubtedly spawning
substantial litigation . . . .”182  The uncertainty and resulting litigation such
decisions generated would threaten tribes, the federal government, and federal
173 Id. at 2.
174 Id. at 3, 6.
175 Id. at 6, 7 (quoting 25 U.S.C. § 479 (2009) and explaining that the definition of “Indian”
in this section “provides a separate definitional mechanism — entirely distinct from the
‘federal jurisdiction’ test — by which the Secretary may acquire land in trust”).
176 Id. at 7.
177 Id. at 8.
178 Id. at 2.
179 Id.
180 Id.  (“[T]he term ‘now’ refers to the time the decision to take land into trust is made.”).
181 Id.
182 Id. at 2–3.
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courts with “enormous resource and reliability costs.”183  This two-pronged
approach is favored by many Indian law activists, groups, observers, and advo-
cates, in addition to Lazarus, as the Carcieri Fix of choice.
In the absence of remedial legislation, Lazarus’ second proposed Carcieri
Fix requires the Department to continue applying its pre-Carcieri interpretation
of the statutory text and the long-standing policies and procedures it has imple-
mented on the basis of that interpretation.184  As Justice Breyer explained in his
concurrence, Carcieri and the Act itself, in its current form, leave open “the
question of whether tribes could establish dual status of being recognized post-
1934 yet under federal jurisdiction pre-1934.”185  Justice Breyer, whose con-
currence was joined in part by Justices Souter and Ginsburg, recognized that
the concepts of federal recognition and federal jurisdiction may not be inter-
changeable.186  In fact, they may be conceptually distinct from each other.187
The majority holding in Carcieri did not resolve the issue one way or the other.
As a result, the question as to the relationship of federal recognition to federal
jurisdiction and whether the two are entirely different concepts remains unan-
swered.188  This open question bolsters both the desirability and legality of
Lazarus’ second proposed Carcieri Fix.
Given the uncertainty generated by this issue, Lazarus argued that, in the
wake of Carcieri, the Department of the Interior is the government entity best
positioned to clarify the relationship between these two key concepts.189  Laza-
rus lauded the pre-Carcieri agency practice of making two separate determina-
tions (one proposed and one final) as being supported by “the better reading of
statutory text and the view that better comports with congressional purpose.”190
Based on the principle of deference to agency interpretations, Lazarus main-
tained that, even after Carcieri, “Interior retains the authority to reinstate its
prior view” that “recognition” and “under federal jurisdiction” require separate
determinations.191
Lazarus further pointed out that federal regulations governing the Depart-
ment’s decision-making on issues involving tribal recognition affirmatively
require tribes seeking recognition to demonstrate they have been in existence
since 1900.192  As such, there should be no question as to whether any tribe
183 Id. at 3.
184 Id.
185 Id.  (“The Supreme Court . . . made clear . . . that both substantively and procedurally
the question of whether tribes could establish the dual status of being recognized post-1934
yet under federal jurisdiction pre-1934 remains an open one.”).
186 Id.
187 Id.
188 Id.  Lazarus noted that his suggestion to determine that a tribe federally recognized post-
1934 “was nonetheless ‘under Federal jurisdiction’ in 1934” requires “two determinations
[that] are distinct inquiries.” Id. at 3, 5.  He recognized that this approach is contrary to, or
at least “in tension with,” the then-current presidential administration’s insistence at the
Supreme Court oral argument “that recognition and under federal jurisdiction were coexten-
sive determinations.” Id. at 5.
189 Id. at 5.
190 Id. 
191 Id.
192 Id. (citing 25 C.F.R. 83.7(a)).   Lazarus points out that Justice Breyer’s concurrence
“identifies some relevant indicia of federal jurisdiction, such as continuing obligations by the
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recognized through this process was under federal jurisdiction in 1934.193  It
would be inequitable and illogical, according to Lazarus, “to deny the benefits
of the IRA, including the trust land provision, to tribes that, through no fault of
their own, were left off the original IRA list . . . .”194  Likewise, tribes that can
show they “otherwise continuously existed (and thus, were under federal juris-
diction) as an Indian tribe from historic times to the present” should be afforded
the benefits and privileges available under the IRA.195
Both Lazarus’ third and fourth Carcieri remedies, like his second propo-
sal, essentially endorse the pre-Carcieri understanding of the Department’s
authority and recommend that certain administrative practices be continued.
Explaining the third Carcieri Fix, Lazarus defended the Department’s exercise
of its administrative authority, pursuant to the definition of “Indian” in Section
479 of the IRA, to continue to take land into trust for Indians with half or more
Indian blood.196  Arguably, Carcieri did not disturb this provision of the
IRA.197
As a fourth proposed antidote to Carcieri’s potentially detrimental effect
on tribal sovereignty, Lazarus focused on the Department’s authority to take
into trust on a tribe’s behalf any excess federal land within the reservation
boundaries of a recognized Indian group, band, or tribe.198  The Supreme
Court’s holding in Carcieri did nothing to disturb the congressional delegation
of authority to the General Services Administration permitting excess real prop-
erty that is (a) owned by the federal government and (b) falls within an Indian
reservation to be transferred to the Secretary.199  Lazarus conceded that the
federal policy of “forc[ing] Indians onto individual allotments, which were
carved out of reservations, and open[ing] up unallotted lands for non-Indian
settlements,” complicates the question of “whether land is within an Indian
reservation.”200  Moreover, as a practical matter, the need for the Department to
exercise such authority would likely be a rare occurrence.201
With his fifth proposed “fix” for mitigating any undesirable consequences
of Carcieri, Lazarus opted for a road less travelled.  His fifth proposal assumes
that the President retains some independent authority to take land into trust for
Indian tribes.202  This assumption may be flawed in that, although the President
had authority to create trust lands for Indian tribes in the late 1800s and early
1900s, Congress effectively withdrew much, if not all, of that authority, in
1919, when it ended the President’s authority to create reservation land out of
United States to the tribe, an ongoing government-to-government relationship despite the
federal government’s mistaken belief that the tribe was terminated, or subjection of the tribe
to a congressional appropriation or enrollment with the [BIA] . . . .” Id. at 4.
193 Lazarus Testimony, supra note 168, at 5.
194 Id.
195 Id.
196 Id. at 6-7.
197 Id. at 7.
198 Id.
199 Id. (citing 40 U.S.C. § 523 (2009)).
200 Id. at 7 (citing Solem v. Bartlett, 465 U.S. 463, 466–67 (1984)).
201 Id. (citing 40 U.S.C. § 523(b)(1) (2009) and providing the example of when a military
base falls within the boundaries of an Indian reservation).
202 Id. at 8.
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public lands.203  Before the President could exercise executive authority to
make land-into-trust acquisitions, Congress would need to make an affirmative
determination to settle, at least for the time being, the issue of whether the
President has independent authority to take land into trust for Indian tribes.
Accordingly, while Lazarus’ fifth proposal is fascinating from a scholarly per-
spective as a question of executive authority,204 it is the least likely of all of the
proposed Carcieri Fixes to be explored or implemented by lawmakers.
2. W. Ron Allen:  Comprehensive Application of Federal Policy to All
Tribes
The National Congress of American Indians (“NCAI”) urged Congress to
“reinstate the principle” of treating all federally recognized Indian tribes
equally.205  W. Ron Allen, who testified to the Senate Committee on Indian
Affairs on behalf of the NCAI, called for a collaborative effort between the
Indian Affairs Committee, General Services Administration, and Indian tribes
to identify and implement a practical legislative “fix” in the aftermath of
Carcieri.206
Allen began by reminding legislators of the original policy purpose of the
IRA:  re-establishment of tribal governments and restoration of tribal lands.
The legislative intent motivating the IRA was to reverse the “disastrous federal
policy of ‘allotment’ and sale of reservation lands” that deprived tribes of over
90 million acres of land.207  Nearly three-quarters of a century has passed since
the IRA was enacted.  To date, however, only eight percent of the 90 million
acres lost has been reclaimed and taken into trust on behalf of tribes.208  Allen
identified Section 5 of the IRA209 as “integral” to the Act’s “overall goals of
recovering from the loss of land and reestablishing tribal economic, govern-
mental and cultural life.”210  In Section 5, Congress provided for the practical
implementation of the concept that “all tribes in all circumstances need a tribal
homeland . . . to support tribal culture and self-determination.”211
The temporal limitation imposed by the Carcieri Court does not square
with this legislative history, which indicates federal policy should be applied
203 Id. at 8-9 (citing 43 U.S.C. § 150 (2009) as providing that public lands cannot be
reserved or taken for an Indian reservation “except by act of Congress”).
204 Id. at 9 (acknowledging that “the argument that the President alone could . . . chart an
independent course for the creation of trust-like Indian lands . . . would be difficult to estab-
lish in the fact of both contrary statutory and Supreme Court direction”).
205 Hearing to Examine Executive Branch Authority to Acquire Trust Land for Indian
Tribes, Before the S. Comm. on Indian Affairs, 111th Cong. 1 (2009) (testimony of The Hon.
W. Ron Allen, Sec’y, Nat’l Cong. of Am. Indians), available at http://indian.senate.gov/
public/_files/Allentestimony.pdf (last visited Apr. 14, 2010) [hereinafter NCAI Testimony].
206 Id. at 7.
207 Id. at 2.
208 Id. at 3.
209 25 U.S.C. §465 (2009) provides:
The Secretary of the Interior is authorized, in his discretion, to acquire, through purchase, relin-
quishment, gift, exchange, or assignment, any interest in lands, water rights, or surface rights to
lands, within or without existing reservations, including trust or otherwise restricted allotments,
whether the allottee be living or deceased, for the purpose of providing land for Indians.
210 NCAI Testimony, supra note 205, at 2.
211 Id. at 3 (emphasis added).
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comprehensively to all tribes.  Indeed, in the view of many, including the
NCAI, the Carcieri holding runs directly counter to the underlying policy pur-
pose of the IRA.  As such, the NCAI takes the position that Carcieri stands in
direct opposition to “tribal self-determination and tribal economic self-
sufficiency.”212
Beyond questioning the Carcieri Court’s statutory interpretation in the
light of legislative history, the NCAI’s objection goes one step further.  Carried
to its logical conclusion, according to the NCAI, the rationale the Court used to
reach its holding ignores the federal government’s constitutional jurisdiction
over Indian tribes.213  The Court based its holding on a plain meaning interpre-
tation of the word “now” in the ever-famous clause “now under federal juris-
diction.”  Allen and the NCAI have viewed this focus on interpreting the word
“now” as too narrow, even misguided, in that it produces a result that the NCAI
believes ignores legislative history and disregards well-established doctrine
regarding the federal government’s constitutional jurisdiction over tribes.214
It is a well-established principle of federal Indian law that the federal gov-
ernment has jurisdiction over all tribes and Indian people unless they cease
tribal relations or federal supervision is terminated.215  Even tribes added to the
list of recognized tribes after 1934, pursuant to the process outlined in federal
regulations, must pass basic threshold tests that demonstrate they existed in
1934.216  In Part 83, the regulations outline a practical framework for the BIA
to apply in determining whether a particular Indian tribe is federally recog-
nized.  Among other things, this framework calls for the tribe to demonstrate
continued federal acknowledgement and show that its tribal status and federal
relations have never been affirmatively revoked by Congress.217  According to
Allen, these requirements presuppose that the federal government has jurisdic-
tion over all tribes that existed in 1934, whether or not the federal government
was aware at the time that a particular tribe existed.218  As a result, the tempo-
ral limitation established by Carcieri does not square with the regulatory
framework governing federal recognition and the resulting exercise of the fed-
eral government’s constitutional jurisdiction.219  Based on this, Allen urged
executive branch agencies to continue application of the Part 83 framework in
the same manner as it was applied prior to the Carcieri decision.220
212 Id. at 1.
213 Id. at 5.
214 Id.
215 Id. at 6 (citing COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW  § 14.01[2] – [3] (2005
ed.); U.S. v. Nice, 241 U.S. 591, 598 (1916) (“the tribal relation may be dissolved and the
national guardianship brought to an end, but it rests with Congress to determine when and
how this shall be done, and whether the emancipation shall at first be complete or only
partial”)).  Allen further asserts that the Supreme Court’s decisions between 1860 and 1920
follow a consistent pattern of recognizing, on the one hand, congressional authority to “ter-
minate federal guardianship,” while affirming, on the other hand, that “Congress retained
jurisdiction over Indians . . . so long as tribal relations were maintained.” NCAI Testimony,
supra note 205, at 6.
216 25 C.F.R. § 83.7 (2010).
217 25 C.F.R. §§ 83.7(a)-(c) (2010), 83.7(g) (2010).
218 NCAI Testimony, supra note 205, at 5-6.
219 Id.
220 Id. at 1.
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With regard to the burden of proof a tribe bears in establishing federal
recognition after Carcieri, Allen asserted that the High Court’s holding leaves
the regulatory landscape virtually unchanged.221  According to Allen,
Carcieri’s requirement that a tribe must be “under federal jurisdiction” in 1934
places no additional burden on tribes seeking recognition under Part 83.222
Rather, the burden of proof falls on those opposing application of the IRA to a
particular tribe.223 Because all tribes existing in 1934 were under federal juris-
diction, whether known to be or not, tribes seeking recognition need only
demonstrate ongoing tribal relations with the federal government — just as
they were required to do prior to Carcieri.224 Those opposing a tribe’s recog-
nition would need to successfully rebut the Constitutional presumption that fed-
eral jurisdiction over tribes exists unless and until federal government relations
with the tribe have been broken off, or federal recognition has been revoked by
an affirmative Act of Congress.225
Along with urging federal agencies to continue their past practice, Allen
issued a warning.  While Carcieri only addressed land-into-trust determina-
tions, the High Court’s rationale opens the door to future attempts by interest
groups to use Carcieri as a springboard for launching attacks on other aspects
of the IRA’s comprehensive scheme.  Allen warned that such attacks could
target the stability of tribal constitutions, business entities, service provisions,
and tribal criminal justice systems.226  On behalf of the NCAI, Allen urged
Congress to act swiftly to stem this potential tide of adverse ramifications to
tribal interests.227
3. Lawrence E. Long:  Reexamining the Land-Into-Trust Framework
On behalf of the Conference of Western Attorneys General (“CWAG”),
Lawrence E. Long advocated for a position completely opposite that advanced
by Allen on behalf of the NCAI.  Rather than urge that the status quo continue,
Long argued that Carcieri provides Congress with an opportunity to reexamine
the land-into-trust process.228  Reexamination is needed, according to propo-
nents of this view, to fix fundamental flaws in the way the Part 83 regulations
are currently applied.
First, advocates of reexamination argue, the current federal recognition
process is governed by unclear regulations.229  Scant guidance exists within the
Part 83 regulations on how to weigh the various factors that must be considered





226 Id. at 2.
227 Id.
228 Hearing to Examine Executive Branch Authority to Acquire Trust Land for Indian
Tribes, Before the S. Comm. on Indian Affairs, 111th Cong. 1 (2009) (testimony of Law-
rence E. Long, Att’y Gen. of South Dakota), available at http://indian.senate.gov/public/
index.cfm?FuseAction=Hearings.Testimony&Hearing_ID=ac679a41-14fa-4305-b511-03a8
51625b6f&Witness_ID=ffe145a3-2862-4edf-814d-99b23285b63d (last visited Apr. 14,
2010) [hereinafter CWAG Testimony].
229 Id. at 7-8.
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when evaluating a tribe’s trust application.230  This is not a novel or revolution-
ary notion and has been a continued source of uncertainty for tribes seeking
recognition under that process.  According to the CWAG position, this uncer-
tainty and lack of guidance justifies congressional reexamination of the entire
regulatory framework.231
More controversial is the second premise of the CWAG position — that
practical application of the Part 83 process is biased in favor of tribes — and
may actually inhibit tribal economic development.232  In his Senate testimony,
Long asserted that, despite broadly written text, Congress intended a narrow
application of the IRA’s land-into-trust provisions and the Part 83 regulations
that flowed from it.233  The sole purpose of these provisions, according to the
CWAG, was to provide land for landless Indians.234  This purpose has long
since been abandoned.235  The CWAG goes even further, asserting that Con-
gress should review the merits of the program to ensure that it has not outgrown
its usefulness.236  A primary motivation for the land-into-trust program was to
promote tribal economic development.  But, as many tribes now have signifi-
cant gaming revenue to purchase land, the myriad of bureaucratic strings placed
on trust land often functions not to promote, but to inhibit tribal economic
growth.237
As further support for the CWAG’s position that the Part 83 land-into-
trust process should be reevaluated, Long pointed to the often adverse impact
of that process on state and local governments.238  In the view of the CWAG,
the current process exacts a heavy toll on state and local governments by
removing land from local jurisdictions and placing it into trust.239  As a result
of the land’s removal from local jurisdictions, local governments lose tax reve-
nue and zoning authority.240  A pro-tribal bias thus lurks, as a practical matter,
in the way the Part 83 regulations are implemented and the manner in which the
federal policy scheme is applied.241
The pro-tribal bias, already inherent in the regulations, is strengthened as
the unclear regulations are enforced by a federal agency charged with strongly
advocating tribal interests.242  As a result, the CWAG asserts, states and local
governments simply do not receive a fair and impartial review of their positions
in the land-into-trust process.243  The High Court’s holding in Carcieri calls
into question the very foundation of the Department’s methodology in applying
230 Id. at 7.
231 Id. at 8.
232 Id.
233 Id. at 1.
234 Id.
235 Id. at 2.
236 Id. at 3.
237 Id. at 3-4.




242 Id. at 8.
243 Id.
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federal regulations in making prior land-into-trust determinations.244  By
upending decades of agency practice, the Carcieri holding places a flawed or
obsolete regulatory scheme in the spotlight.245  As such, Carcieri opens the
door to a more balanced, updated regulatory framework to govern the imple-
mentation of the federal government’s obligations to tribes.246
V. POST-CARCIERI QUESTIONS REMAIN UNANSWERED:  CAN “NOW” EVER
MEAN ANYTHING BUT “THEN?”
The Court’s decision in Carcieri left many unanswered questions.  The
holding does not provide a clear definition of “Indian” under the IRA, nor does
it clearly identify which tribes can still use the IRA land-into-trust process to
gain land.  Further, while the Court’s analysis centers on defining the word
“now,” little guidance is given as to the meaning of “under federal jurisdiction”
and the impact of federal recognition on federal jurisdiction.247
A. To Which Tribes Is Carcieri’s Holding Applicable?
Because Carcieri narrows the definition of “Indian” to only those under
federal jurisdiction in 1934, many commentators have questioned exactly
which tribes this applies to and whether or not it extends into other areas of the
IRA outside of the land-into-trust context.248  Several tribes have already begun
to speculate as to the factual and historical basis (such as treaties, participation
in the allotment process, and identification by Congress) that will suffice to
demonstrate that the tribe was under federal jurisdiction in 1934 even though it
received federal recognition much later.249
For example, the Mashpee Wampanoag Tribe in Massachusetts, which
received federal recognition in May 2007, has two trust applications pend-
ing.250  The Tribe’s Vice Chairman, Aaron Tobey, has argued that the Tribe
will be able to demonstrate that it was under federal jurisdiction in 1934




247 See NCAI Testimony, supra note 205.
248 Gale Courey Toensing, Interview with John Echohawk, INDIAN COUNTRY TODAY, May
6, 2009, available at http://www.indiancountrytoday.com/archive/44129317.html (last vis-
ited Apr. 14, 2010). See also Indianz.com, House Panel Holds First Hearing on Land-Into-
Trust Ruling, Apr. 2, 2009, http://64.38.12.138/News/2009/013895.asp (last visited Apr. 14,
2010).
249 Indianz.com, Shakopee Tribe Not Worried About Land-Into-Trust, Mar. 19, 2009, http://
indianz.com/News/2009/013675.asp (last visited Apr. 14, 2010) (The Shakopee Tribe was
not federally recognized until 1969, but claims its treaties and participation in the allotment
process demonstrate it was under federal jurisdiction).  Likewise, the Santa Ynez Band of
Chumash Indians, federally recognized in 1979, has been under federal jurisdiction since at
least 1881 since it was specifically identified by acts of Congress.  Leah Etling, Ruling Lim-
its Tribe Expansions, SANTA YNEZ VALLEY JOURNAL, Mar. 5, 2009, available at http://
www.santaynezvalleyjournal.com/archive/7/10/3971/ (last visited Apr. 14, 2010).
250 Indianz.com, Massachusetts Tribe Blasts Land-Into-Trust Ruling, Feb. 25, 2009, http://
64.38.12.138/News/2009/013297.asp (last visited Apr. 14, 2010).
251 Id. 
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aftermath of Carcieri, the Secretary of the Interior has suspended the process-
ing or finalizing of trust applications for tribes, like the Mashpee Wampanoag,
that followed the BIA’s previous administrative recognition process, and for
any other tribe whose federal status in 1934 is in question.252  For the Mashpee
Wampanoag, this will likely lead to significant delays as the Secretary and the
Solicitor’s Office attempt to work out the ramifications of Carcieri on pending
applications.253
Though Justice Breyer’s concurrence leaves open the possibility for tribes
to use facts such as treaties, pre-1934 appropriations, and Congressional recog-
nition to demonstrate they were under federal jurisdiction in 1934, this opportu-
nity to avoid the same fate as the Narragansett is not without consequences for
tribes.254  Costly research, expert reports, and litigation likely loom for tribes
seeking to take advantage of any of these potential Carcieri exceptions.255
At least one tribe is already facing such a hurdle.  In Minnesota, the St.
Louis County Attorney has opposed, based in part on Carcieri, the proposed
trust acquisition of eighty acres of land for the Fond du Lac Band of Minnesota
Chippewa Tribe Indians.256  The County asserted that the Tribe was not under
federal jurisdiction in 1934, and noted in support, that the Tribe’s Constitution
was not approved until 1936, and its Charter was not approved until 1937.257
The County went further, however, arguing that “[u]nless the Tribe can
unequivocally demonstrate that it was under federal jurisdiction on June 18,
1934, the BIA must refuse to process and approve applications for fee to trust
transfers on behalf of the tribe.”258  The Tribe will almost surely face additional
costs if it is held to the “unequivocally demonstrate” standard proposed by the
County if the Tribe proceeds with the trust process.
B. What Legislative Alternatives Would Mitigate Carcieri Consequences?
Even before the Carcieri decision was handed down, legal scholars began
discussing possibilities for a legislative “fix.”259  One such proposal, forwarded
by Michael Anderson in his testimony before the House Committee, urged
Congress to ratify all prior decisions made by the Secretary of the Interior and
252 Indianz.com, BIA Weighs Land-Into-Trust After Supreme Court Ruling, Mar. 26, 2009,
http://indianz.com/News/2009/013782.asp (last visited Apr. 14, 2010).
253 Id.
254 Matthew L.M. Fletcher, ICT Editorial on Carcieri:  Decisions In. “Now” Begins Work
to Fix Carcieri, Turtle Talk, Feb. 26, 2009, http://turtletalk.wordpress.com/2009/02/26/ict-
editorial-on-carcieri/ (last visited Apr. 14, 2010).
255 Id.; see also NCAI Testimony, supra note 205, at 1 (noting the consequences if Con-
gress fails to address the Carcieri decision).
256 See Letter from Timothy Tysdal, St. Louis County Attorney, to Terry Virden, Area
Director, Bureau of Indian Affairs (Mar. 26, 2009) (on file with author).
257 Id.
258 Id. (emphasis added).
259 See Rob Capriccioso, Supreme Court Upends Tribal and Federal Understandings of
IRA: Tribes May Seek Congressional Fix, INDIAN COUNTRY TODAY, Feb. 27, 2009, availa-
ble at http://www.indiancountrytoday.com/national/northeast/40382212.html (last visited
Apr. 14, 2010).
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to affirm the authority of the Secretary to take land into trust for all Indian
tribes.260
Several scholars have proposed that Congress amend the language of Sec-
tion 479.  After oral argument concluded in November 2008, noted Indian legal
scholar Matthew L. M. Fletcher261 suggested that tribes could ask Congress to
define the term “now” or amend the IRA to remove the phrase “now under
federal jurisdiction.”262  Professor Routel proposed a more decisive approach to
the House Committee on Natural Resources, recommending that the phrase
“now under federal jurisdiction” be eliminated altogether from the statute.263
Routel further urged lawmakers to clarify the term “recognized” as a term of art
signaling that a tribe has a government-to-government relationship with the
federal government.264  Such clarification would affirm the term’s current
usage by the Department and preclude it from being interpreted according to its
earlier historical meaning — that the federal government merely knew of the
tribe.265
The NCAI proposed a similar type of amendment to the Senate Committee
on Indian Affairs.  Like Routel’s proposed amendment, the NCAI proposal
would delete the words “now under federal jurisdiction” from the definition of
the term “Indian” in Section 479.266  NCAI’s proposal goes beyond Routel’s
proposed amendment, however, in advocating that Congress add a second sec-
tion to Section 479 expressly ratifying all actions taken by the Secretary pursu-
ant to the IRA for any Indian tribe that was recognized on the date of the
Secretary’s action.267  According to the NCAI, deleting the phrase “now under
federal jurisdiction” would give effect to the congressional intent of the IRA by
allowing broad federal jurisdiction over Indian affairs as provided for in the
U.S. Constitution.268  In keeping with the Constitution’s grant of jurisdiction
over Indian tribes to the federal government, such an amendment would clarify
that all Indian tribes were under federal jurisdiction in 1934 and are therefore
able to benefit from the land-into-trust provisions of the IRA.269  Only Indians
whose tribes have ceased tribal relations or whose federal supervision has been
expressly terminated by Congress would be excluded from federal
jurisdiction.270
The National Indian Gaming Association (“NIGA”) recently adopted a
resolution proposing a different type of amendment.271  The NIGA’s Carcieri
260 Ramifications Hearing, supra note 3, at 30 (statement of Michael J. Anderson).
261 Matthew L.M. Fletcher is an Associate Professor of Law at Michigan State University
College of Law and Director of the Indigenous Law & Policy Center.  He speaks and writes
extensively on matters of Indian and gaming law.  MSU Law: Faculty Profile, http://
www.law.msu.edu/faculty_staff/profile.php?prof=494 (last visited Apr. 14, 2010).
262 Capriccioso, supra note 259.
263 Ramifications Hearing, supra note 3, at 30 (statement of Colette Routel).
264 Id.
265 Id.
266 NCAI Testimony, supra note 205, at 8.
267 Id.
268 See id. at 5.
269 Id. at 6–7.
270 Id. at 6.
271 Nat’l Indian Gaming Ass’n Res. #2-PHX-AM-4-15-09, To Call Upon the United States
to Defend All Indian Trust Lands of All Indian Tribes from Any Third Party Claims and to
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Fix called for a Section 479 amendment adding the words “or hereafter” after
the word “now.”272  Such an amendment would change the definition of Indian
in the IRA to include “all persons of Indian descent who are members of any
recognized tribe now or hereafter under federal jurisdiction . . . .”273  In the
alternative, the NIGA Resolution echoed Professor Routel’s and the NCAI’s
proposal that the phrase “now under federal jurisdiction” be deleted from the
Section 479 definition of Indian.274  The NIGA Resolution also supported
Anderson’s proposed Carcieri Fix, calling for Congress to “ratify[ ] any trust
land acquisitions between 1934 and the date of enactment of a remedial statute,
and by providing the Secretary with authority and direction to ratify other Fed-
eral decisions made under the IRA regarding any Indian tribe at the affected
Indian Tribe’s request.”275  Finally, the NIGA Resolution would prohibit the
creation of lists of tribes that were not under federal jurisdiction and protection
in 1934.276  Based on the notion that all tribes were in existence before the
United States and that the United States government vowed to protect tribes
and their lands, all tribes would be regarded as having been “under federal
jurisdiction” in 1934.277
C. Recent Developments
1. Executive Branch Proposals
In the event that congressional efforts to pass “Carcieri Fix” legislation
fail, the executive branch has reputedly crafted an alternative solution.278
Speaking at the November 2009 Global Gaming Expo, George Skibine, the
Department’s Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary for Indian Affairs,
announced a proposed regulation being considered by the Obama administra-
tion to define the phrase “now under federal jurisdiction.”279  Skibine acknowl-
edged that the idea of a regulatory fix is generally disfavored by tribal
leadership, owing largely to the perception that a regulatory fix will delay, or
even halt, progress towards a legislative remedy, which is regarded as a more
permanent measure.280
Executive Order 13175 requires the executive branch to consult and coor-
dinate with tribal leadership on significant policy initiatives impacting Indian
Seek Legislation to Address the Supreme Court decision in Carcieri v. Salazar, http://
www.indiangaming.org/info/alerts/Carcieri_Resolution.pdf (last visited Apr. 14, 2010)
[hereinafter NIGA Resolution]; see also Gale Courey Toensing, ‘Carcieri Fix’ Among Reso-
lutions Adopted by NIGA, INDIAN COUNTRY TODAY, May 3, 2009, available at http://
www.indiancountrytoday.com/national/44084442.html (last visited Apr. 14, 2010).






278 Gale Courey Toensing, Alternatives in the Works if Carcieri Fix Legislation Fails,
INDIAN COUNTRY TODAY, Nov. 20, 2009, available at http://www.indiancountrytoday.com/
national/70616717.html (last visited Apr. 14, 2010).
279 See id.
280 Id.
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Country.281  In an apparent attempt to adhere to this mandate, the Department
has held three consultation sessions with tribes in the months since the Carcieri
decision was issued.282  President Obama has also reached out to tribal leaders
in an effort to fulfill his campaign commitment to respect the Nation-to-Nation
relationship with Indian tribal governments.283  The President has promised to
hold annual consultation sessions with tribal leadership.284  The likely focus of
the consultation sessions would be tribal sovereignty concerns raised by imple-
menting the aspirational recommendations of Executive Order 13175.285  As
such, future consultation sessions could provide a forum for exploring execu-
tive branch initiatives aimed at counterbalancing any trend towards gradual ero-
sion of tribal sovereignty and self-determination.
2. Further Congressional Hearings
On November 4, 2009, the U.S. House of Representatives Committee on
Natural Resources held legislative hearings on House Bill 3742 and House Bill
3697.286  Representative Nick Rahall (D-W. Va.), the Committee Chairman,
firmly rejected Carcieri, noting that interpretations of Carcieri constitute “an
attack on Congress’ plenary authority over Indians.”287  Representative Doc
Hastings (R-Wash.), the ranking Republican Party member on the Committee
on Natural Resources, took a different view:
It would be neither responsible nor constructive for this Committee or the Congress
to attempt to push through legislation like the bills before us today without consider-
ing the views of the states, counties and cities that we represent and, more impor-
tantly, the states, counties and cities who advanced this case all the way to the United
States Supreme Court where their legal arguments prevailed.288
281 Exec. Order. No. 13,175, 65 Fed. Reg. 218 (Nov. 6, 2000).  This order, entitled “Consul-
tation and Coordination with Indian Tribal Governments,” was issued on November 9, 2000,
but has since been treated by some federal agencies as a checklist of procedural formalities,
without regard for the policy goals of further enhancing tribal self-government and fulfilling
the federal government’s trust obligations to Indian tribes.
282 Rob Capriccioso, Waiting For A Quick Fix, INDIAN COUNTRY TODAY, July 22, 2009,
available at http://www.indiancountrytoday.com/home/content/50466452.html (last visited
Apr. 14, 2010).
283 Press Release, Nat’l Cong. Am. Indians, White House Meeting with Tribal Leaders
Background Paper on Tribal Consultation and Tribal Sovereignty, (Aug. 25, 2009), available
at https://www.ncai.org/fileadmin/press_releases/Meeting_Notice_and_Background_Paper_
on_Tribal_Consultation_and_Tribal_Sovereignty.pdf (last visited Apr. 14, 2010).
284 Id.
285 Id.
286 Hearing on H.R. 3697 and H.R. 3742, To Amend the Act of June 18, 1934, To Reaffirm
the Authority of the Secretary of the Interior to Take Land Into Trust for Indian Tribes,
Before the H. Comm. on Natural Resources, 111th Cong. (2009).
287 Id. at 2 (statement of U.S. Rep. Nick J. Rahall, II, Chairman, Comm. on Natural
Resources).
288 Id. at 3 (statement of U.S. Rep. Doc Hastings, Ranking Republican Member, Comm. on
Natural Resources).
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VI. CONCLUSION:  TRIBAL CONSULTATION HOLDS THE KEY TO PROTECTING
TRIBAL INTERESTS
All of the measures proposed by legislators, scholars, regulatory agencies,
and interest groups seek to achieve essentially the same result, that is, to elimi-
nate any uncertainty created by Carcieri as to the applicability of the IRA to all
recognized tribes.  Congress may be receptive to such a strategy.  Representa-
tive Nick Rahall (D-WV), Chairman of the House Committee on Natural
Resources, warned that, though the ramifications of Carcieri are unknown, it is
certain that “this decision may result in many frivolous lawsuits being filed to
challenge the status of virtually every tribe.”289  In the Senate, Byron Dorgan
(D-N.D.), Chair of the Senate Committee on Indian Affairs, has stated his
belief that the Supreme Court’s decision in Carcieri was wrong and Congress
should remedy it.290  Amending the IRA and ratifying the actions of the Secre-
tary taken pursuant to the IRA would eliminate the potential for costly litigation
that could undermine multiple provisions in the IRA.  For tribes, though the
land-into-trust process is not perfect, any of the proposed Carcieri Fixes pro-
posed would allow the Department to continue applying and enforcing the
IRA’s regulatory framework as they have been applied for the past seventy-five
years.
Regardless of congressional efforts to remedy the uncertainty generated by
the Carcieri holding, tribes and legal scholars must continue to advocate vigor-
ously on behalf of tribal interests.  Accordingly, tribal leaders have urged, and
continue to urge, the federal government to adhere to the federal policy initia-
tive of tribal consultation.291  Tribal consultation may be the only means availa-
ble to tribes, in the aftermath of Carcieri, to ensure that tribal interests are
protected in whatever type of future legislative and regulatory framework
results.
As of today, it remains to be seen whether, and if so, how, the turmoil
Carcieri has caused in Indian Country will be resolved, and whether any such
attempt will succeed in restoring, as a practical matter, the Department’s pre-
Carcieri application of the IRA to land-into-trust determinations.
289 Ramifications Hearing, supra note 3, at 2 (statement of U.S. Rep. Nick J. Rahall, II,
Chairman, Comm. on Natural Resources).
290 Rob Capriccioso, NCAI Leader Warns of New Breed of ‘Indian Fighters,’ INDIAN COUN-
TRY TODAY, June 1, 2009, available at http://www.indiancountrytoday.com/national/
46462497.html (last visited Apr. 14, 2010).
291 See e.g., Capriccioso, supra note 282 (discussing BIA tribal consultations involving
Carcieri).
\\server05\productn\N\nvg\1-1\NVG102.txt unknown Seq: 34 20-JUL-10 15:20
